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Robin L. Juni*

When the Math Matters: Improving
Statistical Advocacy in
Gerrymandering Litigation
ABSTRACT
Lawyers regularly joke about their supposed inability to address mathematical
issues. However, mathematical concepts are sometimes at the core of a legal
dispute, and lawyers do a disservice to their clients if they are not able to engage in effective advocacy in these contexts. This Article discusses Gill v. Whitford, a gerrymandering dispute involving an important mathematical idea—
the core statistical concept of regression analysis, particularly multivariable
regression analysis—which Chief Justice Roberts referred to in Whitford as
“sociological gobbledygook.” In fact, the mathematical analysis has crucial implications and connections to the legal issues. This Article explains the statistics behind that analysis, connects them to the issues before the Court, and
demonstrates that these concepts are employed in many types of litigation. The
Article concludes that, even facing a skeptical court, lawyers who can understand and explain mathematical concepts in a way that resonates fully with
the legal issues are best positioned to advocate for their clients. With new census results released in late 2021 and the opportunities for redistricting that
will subsequently arise, mathematical understanding in the context of gerrymandering litigation is more critical than ever.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MATH CAN MATTER
Lawyers are famously math averse, affirmatively disengaging
when technical concepts come into play and regularly joking about innumeracy as a core characteristic of most in the profession.1 Noting
this phenomenon, scholars have sought to demonstrate areas in which
mathematical reasoning is critical to various legal disputes and to explain how numerical skills might be improved among lawyers and law
students.2
This Article seeks to build on that scholarship, taking one example
from a legal dispute involving an important mathematical idea—the
core statistical concept of regression analysis, particularly multivariable regression analysis—then explaining the underlying math involved and identifying ways in which counsel can better advocate for
their clients in similar litigation.3 The premise of this effort is that in
many cases, mathematical concepts are critical to the result reached
by a court or regulatory agency, and lawyers who cannot effectively
engage with these concepts may disadvantage their clients. In short,
1. See Lisa Milot, Illuminating Innumeracy, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 769 (2013)
(leading with a quotation from then-First Lady Michelle Obama in remarks to
the National Science Foundation: “I know for me, I’m a lawyer because I was bad
at [science and math]. All lawyers in the room, you know it’s true. We can’t add
and subtract, so we argue.” (alteration in original) (quoting Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the National Science Foundation Family-Friendly
Policy Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011))); see also Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 271, 271 (Spring 2014) (crediting mathematician
John Allen Paulos with the observation that “while readers frequently condemn
grammatical errors, wild mathematical ones often pass undetected” (quoting
JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3–4 (2001))).
2. See, e.g., Arden Rowell & Jessica Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decision Making,
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 191 (2014); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Strength in Numbers: Teaching Numeracy in the Context of Business Associations, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 701
(2015).
3. Multivariable regression analysis has been recognized as having key applications
in employment discrimination, antitrust, capital punishment, and patent damages matters, as well as voting rights litigation. See Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple
Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980).
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the math matters. This Article tackles the issue by explaining how the
courts addressed the statistical analysis in one piece of important litigation in which math was critical. Backing up, the Article lays out the
relevant mathematical concepts before returning to their application
in the litigation. Finally, the conclusion provides advice on how to
move forward. The goal is an understandable roadmap to the necessary integration of math and law, such that a practitioner involved in
similar litigation will be a better prepared advocate. With new census
results recently released setting up a new round of redistricting efforts,4 lawyers’ ability to effectively engage with these issues is
critical.
This analysis is structured around Gill v. Whitford, in which Wisconsin voters alleged the state legislative redistricting plan unconstitutionally diluted their votes through partisan gerrymandering.5 The
Supreme Court found the plaintiffs had not shown sufficiently concrete harm to establish Article III standing and thus remanded to the
district court.6 Though Whitford ultimately was dismissed after a subsequent Supreme Court holding that political gerrymandering cases
are entirely non-justiciable,7 during briefing and oral argument the
Court engaged on the merits—including whether the “efficiency gap,”
the mathematical model used by the plaintiffs, effectively demonstrated improper gerrymandering.8 During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts, addressing appellees’ counsel, Paul Smith, offered a
critique of this evidence:
Mr. Smith, I’m going to follow an example of one of my colleagues and lay
out for you as concisely as I can what—what is the main problem for me and
give you an opportunity to address it.
4. 2020 Census Results, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/decennial-census/decade/2020/2020-census-results.html [https://
perma.cc/3YGN-DGMY] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (“On August 12, we released
the redistricting data to the states and the public. States may use these data in
redrawing congressional, legislative, and local district boundaries.”).
5. Whitford v. Gill (Whitford IV),138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
6. Id. at 1934.
7. Id. at 1933. In July 2019, the district court dismissed Whitford without prejudice
“in light of Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Supreme Court held that ‘partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the
federal courts.’ ” Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111625 at
*3 (W.D. Wis. July 2, 2019) (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2506 (2019)).
8. A mathematical model is a “mathematical framework representing variables and
their interrelationships to describe observed phenomena or predict future
events.” PIETER EYKHOFF, SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: PARAMETER AND STATE ESTIMATION (1974); see also Teegwendé V. Porgo et al., The Use of Mathematical Modeling Studies for Evidence Synthesis and Guideline Development: A Glossary, 10
RSCH. SYNTHESIS METHODS 125 (2018) (describing and defining a variety of mathematical models).
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I would think if these—if the claim is allowed to proceed, there will naturally be a lot of these claims raised around the country. Politics is a very important driving force and those claims will be raised.
And every one of them will come here for a decision on the merits. These
cases are not within our discretionary jurisdiction. They’re the mandatory jurisdiction. We will have to decide in every case whether the Democrats win or
the Republicans win. So it’s going to be a problem here across the board.
And if you’re the intelligent man on the street and the Court issues a decision, and let’s say, okay, the Democrats win, and that person will say: “Well,
why did the Democrats win?” And the answer is going to be because EG was
greater than 7 percent, where EG is the sigma of party X wasted votes minus
the sigma of party Y wasted votes over the sigma of party X votes plus party Y
votes.
And the intelligent man on the street is going to say that’s a bunch of
baloney. It must be because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over
the Republicans. And that’s going to come out one case after another as these
cases are brought in every state.
And that is going to cause very serious harm to the status and integrity of
the decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country.
....
It is just not, it seems, a palatable answer to say the ruling was based on
the fact that EG was greater than 7 percent. That doesn’t sound like language
in the Constitution.
....
. . . [T]he whole point is you’re taking these issues away from democracy
and you’re throwing them into the courts pursuant to, and it may be simply
my educational background, but I can only describe as sociological
gobbledygook.9

While his disclaimer attracted some media attention,10 Chief Justice
Roberts is far from the first justice to raise concerns about the ability
of the Court to address scientific and mathematical issues.11 The rise
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–40, Whitford IV, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 161161), 2017 WL 4517131, at *37–40.
10. Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Choice on Partisan Gerrymandering, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/the-supreme-courts-choice-on-partisan-gerrymandering/556661/ [https://perma.cc/
8ALK-ETCU]; Oliver Roeder, The Supreme Court Is Allergic to Math (Oct. 17,
2017, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-is-allergic-to-math/ [https://perma.cc/QW8J-73MP]; Philip Rocco, Justice Roberts Said
Political Science Is ‘Sociological Gobbledygook.’ Here’s Why He Said It and Why
He’s Mistaken, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/04/justice-roberts-said-political-science-is-sociological-gobbledygook-heres-why-he-said-it-and-why-hes-mistaken/ [https://
perma.cc/3JYE-94FP].
11. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 599 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The various briefs filed in
this case . . . deal with definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review—in short, matters far afield from the expertise of
judges.”); Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (“It is an old observation that the training of
Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by
patent legislation.”).
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of ever-more sophisticated data analytics, however, makes the second
decade of the twenty-first century a particularly inopportune time to
continue the “lawyers can’t do math” trope. When a court dismisses a
key argument as inscrutable nonsense, it implicates a breakdown of
advocacy as much as the limitations of the judiciary. The remainder of
this Article seeks to unpack the issue before the Court in Whitford and
to help figure out how to do it better.12
II. GILL V. WHITFORD
A.

Case Background

The rise of the Republican Tea Party after the election of former
president Barack Obama led to the “Tea Party Wave” of 2010—Republicans swept into power in many federal and state government positions, in many places for the first time in years.13 This change in the
political dynamic coincided with the 2010 census14 and an opportunity
for political redistricting based on new census numbers.15
12. At the outset, it is fair to recognize that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to hear
partisan gerrymandering cases might have carried the day no matter what arguments were made. See Roeder, supra note 10 (“[M]aybe this allergy to statistical
evidence is really a smoke screen—a convenient way to make a decision based on
ideology while couching it in terms of practicality.” As University of Chicago law
professor Daniel Hemel states: “I don’t put much stock in the claim that the Supreme Court is afraid of adjudicating partisan gerrymanders because it’s afraid
of math . . . [Roberts] is very smart and so are the judges who would be adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims—I’m sure he and they could wrap their
minds around the math. The ‘gobbledygook’ argument seems to be masking
whatever his real objection might be.” (alteration in original)). However, even a
skeptical court is less likely to dismiss mathematical arguments out of hand
when those arguments are clearly made and directly tied to the legal claims at
issue.
13. See Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skoepol & John Coggin, The Tea Party and the
Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 PERSPS. ON POL. 25 (2011); Alan I.
Abramowitz, Right Turn: The 2010 Midterm Elections, in PENDULUM SWING 55
(Larry J. Sabato ed., 2012).
14. History: Agency History, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/
www/census_then_now/ [https://perma.cc/RZE8-Z5JG] (last visited Sept. 23,
2021); see also SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11360, APPORTIONMENT
AND REDISTRICTING FOLLOWING THE 2020 CENSUS 1 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11360 [https://perma.cc/U3PG-AN8D]
(describing problems with 2020 census and explaining that “April 1 of any year
ending in ‘0’ marks the official decennial census date,” although the Census Bureau begins certain population counts and outreach earlier. “A count known as
the apportionment population, which reflects the total resident population in
each state,” including minors and noncitizens, in addition to Armed Forces and
federal civilian personnel and their dependents living abroad, “is typically used to
distribute House seats. Within nine months of the decennial census date (December 31 of the year ending in ‘0’), the Secretary of Commerce is to report the apportionment population to the President.”).
15. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. Although state legislatures enjoy substantial discretion in the process, constitutional guidelines for district creation require each dis-
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In Wisconsin, Republicans captured a majority of state legislative
seats in 2010. The Republican-led legislature then enacted a new districting plan in 2011, Wisconsin Act 43, based on the 2010 census.16
The next year, the American people—and Wisconsin citizens—voted
in the 2012 election. In the 2012 presidential race, Barack Obama won
the state with 53.5% of the statewide vote, receiving Wisconsin’s ten
electoral votes.17 In elections for the state legislature, however,
Republicans won sixty out of ninety-nine Wisconsin Assembly districts, a result that engendered concern among Democrats.18
William Whitford and other Wisconsin citizens ultimately filed a
complaint in federal court alleging that they were redistricted based
on their affiliation to a specific political party—Whitford and the other
plaintiffs registered as Democrats. They claimed that Republicans analyzed the geographic location and distribution of Democratic voters
and shifted the lines of political districts to dilute Democratic Party
votes throughout the state.19 As explained by the district court, “the
complaint alleges that Act 43 purposely distributed the predicted Re-

16.

17.
18.

19.

trict to be as equal in population to all other districts in the state “as practicable,”
while the boundaries and parameters of the districts should adhere to traditional
districting principles like compactness and contiguity. See Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2004);
Justin Levitt, Where Are the Lines Drawn?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://
redistricting.lls.edu/redistricting-101/where-are-the-lines-drawn/ [https://
perma.cc/A247-PBK8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
Joe Forward, Redistricting: Litigation Common, Current Cycle Unique in Wisconsin, STATE BAR WIS. (Mar. 7, 2012), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/RotundaReport/Pages/Article.aspx?ArticleID=7996#bio [https://perma.cc/Q4X2NP6J].
Brendan Fischer, Wisconsin’s “Shameful” Gerrymander of 2012, PRWATCH (Feb.
4, 2013, 8:15 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/NEWS/2013/02/11968/WISCONSINS-SHAMEFUL-GERRYMANDER-2012 [https://perma.cc/X9EP-XW7Y].
Id. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ expert for the ensuing litigation characterized this result as absurd. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer at 38–39, Whitford v. Nichol
(Whitford I), 151 F. Supp. 3d 918 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-421), 2015 WL
10091018, at *38–39 (“Any discussion of Act 43 must begin with the basic fact
that in 2012 Republicans achieved a 60–39 majority in the Assembly in an election in which the Democratic Party achieved 53.5% of the statewide two-party
presidential vote. The imbalance between the Republican Party’s statewide vote
margin at the top of the ticket (46.5%) and its Assembly majority (60.6%) turns
the very notion of partisan symmetry on its head. That standard . . . ‘requires
that the number of seats one party would receive if it garnered a particular percentage of the vote be identical to the number of seats the other party would
receive if it had received the same percentage of the vote’ . . . . Here, it means that
Democrats would have had to obtain 60 Assembly seats with 46.5% of the vote,
an absurd proposition that requires a party’s legislative seat share to go up as its
share of the vote goes down.”).
Complaint at 9, Whitford I, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918 (No. 3:15-cv-421) 2015 WL
4651084, at *9. Like other gerrymandering cases, the case was heard by a threejudge panel and proceeded to direct review in the Supreme Court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2284. That section provides:
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publican vote share with greater efficiency so that it translated into a
greater number of seats, while purposely distributing the Democratic
vote share with less efficiency so that it would translate into fewer
seats.”20
Specifically, the complaint alleged that all plaintiffs were affected
by the general electoral map drawn by Republicans in 2011, and four
plaintiffs further alleged they were directly affected by the redistricting map—Mary Lynn Donohue in the twenty-sixth district, Wendy
Sue Johnson in the ninety-first district, Janet Mitchell in the sixtysixth district, and Jerome Wallace in the twenty-third district. All four
of these plaintiffs alleged their vote was directly diluted, either by the
“cracking” or “packing” of their district.21
As in many gerrymandering cases,22 the plaintiffs asserted that
the Wisconsin electoral districts at issue were so gerrymandered that
(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an action
is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.
(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a district court
of three judges under subsection (a) of this section, the composition and
procedure of the court shall be as follows:
(1) Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the
request is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are
not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall
designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge.
The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the request was
presented, shall serve as members of the court to hear and determine the
action or proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), (b)(1). The panel in Whitford v. Gill (Whitford III), 218 F.
Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), was comprised of Seventh Circuit Judge Ripple
and District Judges Crabb and Griesbach. A party is permitted direct appeal to
the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, which authorizes review of “an
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
20. See Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 854.
21. Complaint, supra note 19, at 9.
22. The practice of gerrymandering, of course, has deep historical roots, with the
name itself deriving from an 1812 Massachusetts election. See THE VOLUME LIBRARY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRACTICAL AND CULTURAL INFORMATION 1407 (1939)
(defining gerrymander as “the process of redistricting a state or other political
division so that one party gets an unfair advantage over another” and further
explaining that “[i]n 1812 when Elbridge Gerry was governor of Massachusetts,
the election districts were redistributed to the advantage of the Democratic-Republican party, and one district (a part of Essex County) had boundaries so eccentric that on the map the outline looked like a dragon. One politician compared it
to a salamander. ‘No, a Gerrymander,’ another said. So the word (originally pronounced with a hard g, but now with a j sound for the initial letter) has become a
general term for unfair districting. (The history experts say that Governor Gerry
was not to blame; the legislature made the new election districts.)”). Gerry later
served from March 1813 until his death in November 1814 as the fifth vice president of the United States under James Madison. Senate Hist. Off., Elbridge
Gerry, 5th Vice President (1813–1814), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
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they adversely affected the plaintiffs’ rights to free speech, free association, and equal protection.23 The plaintiffs claimed they were
targeted for gerrymandering because of their affiliation with the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and their past voting history as Democrats.24 The complaint averred: “Wisconsin Act 43 violates the First
and Fourteenth Amendment because it intentionally uses [plaintiffs’]
partisan affiliation to affect the weight of their votes.”25 Thus, the
plaintiffs alleged, Wisconsin Act 43 infringed on their First Amendment rights to express a political opinion and to affiliate with the
party of their choice, and their Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
equal treatment as citizens, regardless of party affiliation or voting
characteristics.26
The district court pointed out that the Supreme Court had not precluded relief for a partisan gerrymandering claim, though the Court
had not heard the merits of such a case for lack of an appropriate standard of review. However, the plaintiffs proposed a three-part test for
establishing an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and the district court found it judicially manageable enough to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss.27 First, the plaintiffs must prove “that
the defendants intended to discriminate against an ‘identifiable political group’ of which the plaintiffs are a member.”28 Second, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate discriminatory effect of the electoral map,
which was accomplished in Whitford with efficiency gap statistical

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

about/officers-staff/vice-president/gerry-elbridge.htm [https://perma.cc/CT9BSANL] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). In particular, districts must be approximately
equal in population, so as not to violate the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Moreover, a voting plan must comply with Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which preserves the voting power of minority
groups. 52 U.S.C. § 10301; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
Complaint, supra note 19 at 9.
Id. at 24–28.
Id.
Whitford I, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918, 928, 931 (W.D. Wis. 2015); Recent Case, Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016), 130
HARV. L. REV. 1954 (2017).
Whitford I, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 927. The plaintiffs presented numerous allegations
on this issue, including that the Republican state legislators formed a plan to
dilute Democratic voters, hired mathematicians to create an electoral map with
the intent to dilute Democratic votes, and asked Republican legislators to sign
non-disclosure agreements. The complaint specifically names several people who
allegedly orchestrated the creation of the new, intentionally discriminatory plan.
The complaint alleges that the Republican legislators not only intended to create
an electoral map that favored Republicans but also expressly intended to create a
map with a twelve percent efficiency gap favoring Republicans. Complaint, supra
note 19 at 9.
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analysis. If the plaintiffs successfully established intent and discriminatory effect, the burden shifted to the defendants for step three, to
controvert the claim by showing the electoral map bias was “the necessary result of either a legitimate state policy or the state’s underlying
political geography.”29
B.

Efficiency Gap

The Whitford complaint presents the efficiency gap as a mathematical tool to determine if political districting is unconstitutional. Generally, the political gerrymandering claim avers that ignoring natural
geographic lines, votes are either: (1) “cracked” between districts,
where a geographic block of opposite-party voters is split to dilute the
votes across districts and fall short of a majority in each one; (2)
“packed,” where opposite-party voters are consolidated into a small
number of districts where they elect their preferred candidates but
waste many votes in landslide victories, votes that may have made
other district elections competitive, had they not been packed; or (3)
both.30 One party thus is able to maximize the total number of elected
representatives without winning any more voters from one election to
the next but rather by moving voters from one jurisdiction to another.31 The number of votes needed—and therefore the amount of
cracking or packing required—can be calculated by reviewing voting
29. Whitford I, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 928. Such “underlying political geography” might
occur if, for example, “political groups that tend to cluster (as is the case with
Democratic voters in cities) [c]ould be systematically affected by what might be
called a ‘natural’ packing effect.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004). But
see ANTHONY J. MCCANN, ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA 135 (2016)
(“[G]eographic and demographic constraints (such as the urban concentration of
Democratic voters, the requirement to draw majority–minority districts, and the
geographic sorting of voters) cannot account for the level of partisan bias we observe and certainly cannot account for the increase in bias we observe between
the 2000 and 2010 districting rounds.”).
30. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850–51 (2015) (“Our analysis begins
with the premise that the goal of a partisan gerrymander is to win as many seats
as possible given a certain number of votes. To accomplish this aim, a party must
ensure that its votes translate into seats more ‘efficiently’ than do those of its
opponent. In the plurality-rule, single-member district (SMD) elections that are
almost universal in American politics, ‘inefficient’ votes are those that do not directly contribute to victory. Thus, any vote for a losing candidate is wasted by
definition, but so too is any vote beyond the 50 percent threshold needed (in a
two-candidate race) to win a seat. If these supporters could be moved through
redistricting to a different seat, they could help the party claim that seat as well
without changing the outcome in the seat from which they were moved.” (footnote
omitted)).
31. Id. at 850 (“A gerrymander is simply a district plan that results in one party
wasting many more votes than its adversary. And the efficiency gap indicates the
magnitude of the divergence between the parties’ respective wasted votes. It aggregates all of a plan’s cracking and packing choices into a single number.”).
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data across multiple elections, then determining the necessary minimum threshold for victory.32 Votes affected by cracking and packing
are considered “diluted,” because they lack the power to which each is
otherwise entitled,33 while “wasted” votes are those in excess of what
was needed to win a given district or all votes in districts that are not
won. The efficiency gap is calculated by dividing the difference in
wasted votes by the total number of votes cast, quantifying the effects
of cracking and packing. In other words, the purpose of cracking and
packing is not just to dilute and waste votes for the opposing party,
but to maximize the weight and importance of each vote for the preferred candidate, so the gulf between the parties’ wasted votes will be
significant where districts have been engineered for precisely that result. Once the discriminatory effect is quantified as the efficiency gap,
it can be compared to the efficiency gaps of previous district maps or of
similarly situated districts elsewhere.
Building on the cracking and packing concept, the Whitford approach explains the efficiency gap argument in terms of earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding partisan bias.34 The crux of
those earlier arguments is the premise that electoral systems should
treat similarly-situated political parties equally, such that in theory,
partisan districts undercutting that premise could be unconstitutional.35 However, the Court has articulated a critical concern regarding the partisan bias approach, finding that “[t]he existence or degree
of [bias] may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible
vote-switchers will reside. . . . [W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that
would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.”36
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (discussing predicates for
vote dilution in the context of racial gerrymandering claims); see also Benjamin
Plener Cover, Rucho for Minimalists, 71 MERCER L. REV. 695, 697 (2020) (“[T]he
Court conceptualized partisan gerrymandering as allocative vote dilution,
whereby a mapmaker reallocates votes towards a favored party by subjecting disfavored voters to packing and cracking techniques that diminish the efficacy of
their votes.”).
34. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral
Systems, 39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 68 (2014) (defining “partisan bias” as the difference between the share of the seats that a party would win if the parties tied in a
statewide election, and the actual share received).
35. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, The Measure of a Metric: The
Debate over Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering, 70 STAN L. REV. 1503, 1505
(2018) (“An analyst would estimate the seat shares the major parties would win
in a state if (hypothetically) they each received the same vote share. The greater
the divergence between the parties’ seat shares for the same (counterfactual) vote
share, the larger a district plan’s partisan bias, and the more gerrymandered the
plan.”).
36. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006).
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Importantly, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v.
Jubelirer stated that though the plaintiffs in that case had not
presented the Court with a manageable standard to adequately assess
the effects of political gerrymandering, it was possible that another
plaintiff may present a justiciable claim in the future.37 For Justice
Kennedy, the key was giving a “limited and precise rationale” that
established a constitutional violation, stating that “if workable standards do emerge . . . courts should be prepared to order relief.”38 The
Whitford plaintiffs stepped into that breach, presenting the efficiency
gap as a metric for partisan bias in gerrymandering cases that avoided
the flaws inherent in previously proposed standards, flaws such as requiring that courts evaluate hypothetical outcomes of a future vote—
an approach the Court discouraged in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.39 Instead, Whitford sought to present accurate
and measurable discriminatory effects of gerrymandering by creating
a district plan that minimized the efficiency gap and then comparing
that plan to the actual map used in Wisconsin Act 43.
Specifically, the Whitford plaintiffs presented two empirical studies, one conducted by Kenneth Mayer, professor of political science at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and one by Simon Jackman,
then a professor of political science at Stanford.40 Citing the Mayer
report, the complaint breaks down the numbers and percentages of
wasted votes in specific counties in Wisconsin and the percentile calculation of partisanship bias based on the efficiency gap metric.41
The plaintiffs detailed Wisconsin’s efficiency gap data under Act
43, alleging that the Wisconsin plan had the twenty-eighth worst efficiency gap score—meaning it has an extremely high level of partisan
gerrymandering—out of nearly 800 total plans surveyed. The complaint described six Wisconsin districts gerrymandered through cracking or packing and alleged seven more were otherwise adversely
37. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Of course,
the Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), finding
that political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable, has undercut the approach, though it still is relevant in racial gerrymandering cases and perhaps in
future political gerrymandering litigation.
38. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306, 317.
39. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420.
40. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 1; Expert Report of Simon
Jackman at 1, Whitford I, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-421),
2015 WL 10091020, at *1.
41. Complaint, supra note 19, at 18. Professor Jackman’s expert report explains:
The efficiency gap (EG) is a relative, wasted vote measure, the ratio of
one party’s wasted vote rate to the other party’s wasted vote rate. EG
can be computed directly from a given election’s results, without recourse to extensive statistical modeling or assumptions about counterfactual or hypothetical election outcomes, unlike other extant measures
of the fairness of an electoral system (e.g., partisan bias).
Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40 at 3.
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affected by redistricting efforts, morphing from not heavily partisan to
solidly Republican in 2012.42
Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin allowed the case to proceed, finding that electoral mapping must give equal weight to all votes unless the discrepancy is based on permissible, legislative concerns.43 The court
discussed the efficiency gap methodology, explaining that the calculation is performed by creating statewide totals for each party of (1) the
number of votes cast for the losing candidates in district races (as a
measure of cracked voters), along with (2) the number of votes cast for
the winning candidates in excess of the fifty-percent-plus-one votes
necessary to secure the candidate’s victory (as a measure of packed
voters). The resulting figure is the total number of wasted votes for
each party.44 As explained by the district court in its merits ruling,
the efficiency gap then is calculated by taking the difference in the
wasted votes for each party, divided by the overall votes cast.45 Under
the methodology, the higher the efficiency gap, the greater the number of seats won because of the opposing party’s wasted votes.46 The
plaintiffs’ experts testified that an efficiency gap model showing a
threshold number greater than seven percent47 in the first year indicates the redistricting plan likely will continue to favor one party for
the life of the plan.48 Thus, the plaintiffs contended, because the

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Complaint, supra note 19, at 19–22.
See Whitford v. Nichol (Whitford II), 180 F. Supp. 3d 583, 587 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
Id. at 588–89.
Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 900 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 30, at 834.
Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 905–06.
Chief Justice Roberts focused on the seven percent number at oral argument,
making the entire enterprise seem arbitrary or nonsensical. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 9 at 37–40 (“It is just not, it seems, a palatable answer to
say the ruling was based on the fact that EG was greater than 7 percent. That
doesn’t sound like language in the Constitution.”). A dissent in the district court
likewise confuses relevant numbers. Posing a hypothetical district where Party
A wins 5,200 votes and Party B wins 4,800 votes, Judge Griesbach claims that
Party A wasted only 199 votes while party B wasted all 4,800—producing, in his
words, “an eye-popping efficiency gap of 46%!” Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d at
956 (Griesbach, J., dissenting). He asserts that the idea of the efficiency gap is
founded on circular logic—that as Republicans win more close elections—which,
as in Judge Griesbach’s hypothetical, generate a large number of wasted Democratic votes and a small number of wasted Republican votes—the efficiency gap
would indicate that the election was the result of gerrymandering. He crucially
misunderstands that the metric is to be applied statewide, as some districts will
be cracked and others packed, and that its usefulness is as a comparative tool to
provide evidence of intentional gerrymandering, not a prescription for proportional representation. Id.
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model forecast a twelve percent efficiency gap for Wisconsin’s redistricting plan, it should be found presumptively unconstitutional.49
C.

Supreme Court Guidance

Although the Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to the
lower court on standing grounds,50 the Whitford decision provides guidance for potential future plaintiffs seeking to litigate similar claims.
Most fundamentally, the majority opinion—authored by Chief Justice
Roberts—explains its concept of individualized harm in gerrymandering cases:
We have long recognized that a person’s right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.” . . . [T]he plaintiffs claim a constitutional right not to be
placed in legislative districts deliberately designed to “waste” their votes in
49. Complaint, supra note 19, at 26; Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40,
at 5. The district court ultimately did not accept that argument, explaining that:
[I]n any event, that we have not determined that a particular measure of
EG establishes presumptive unconstitutionality, which itself diminishes
all of the defendants’ policy-based arguments. Instead, we acknowledge
that the expert opinions in this case have persuaded us that, on the facts
before us, the EG is corroborative evidence of an aggressive partisan gerrymander that was both intended and likely to persist for the life of the
plan.
Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 910.
50. Others have sought to explain why the Court addressed the case on the merits at
all, especially in light of the institutional legitimacy concerns articulated by Chief
Justice Roberts at oral argument that “there will naturally be a lot of these
claims raised around the country . . . [a]nd every one of them will come here for a
decision on the merits.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37. Professors Joshua A. Douglas and Michael E. Solimine explain why the Court engaged
with the substantive issues despite concerns about appearing political:
The answer is that the cases did not come to the Court through its
normal discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Instead, both Gill and
Benisek involved direct appeals to the Supreme Court from three-judge
district courts. The Court had no choice but to hear the cases. Chief Justice Roberts’s concern was that if the Court recognized a claim for partisan gerrymandering, then all of these cases would reach the Supreme
Court on mandatory direct appeal, not via the Court’s discretionary certiorari jurisdiction where the Court could avoid ruling on them.
Under federal law, when three-judge district courts hear cases such
as Gill and Benisek, a losing party may appeal directly to the Supreme
Court, skipping the court of appeals. Thus, in Gill and Benisek, because
the losing parties appealed the decisions, the Court had to do something
with respect to the cases. Unlike a denial of certiorari, refusing to hear
them would have been tantamount to a summary affirmance on the merits, which lower courts likely would have considered to have at least
some precedential value. Instead, the Court took a middle ground in Gill
and Benisek, hearing them on the merits but providing little guidance on
the doctrine of partisan gerrymandering beyond saying in Gill that
plaintiffs must demonstrate individual harm from a map in a specific
district.
Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District
Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 415–16 (2019) (footnotes
omitted).
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elections where their chosen candidates will win in landslides (packing) or are
destined to lose by closer margins (cracking).
To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that
injury is district specific.51

Because “a plaintiff’s remedy must be ‘limited to the inadequacy that
produced [his] injury in fact.’ . . . the remedy that is proper and sufficient lies in the revision of the boundaries of the individual’s own district.”52 The majority opinion concludes: “On the facts of this case, the
plaintiffs may not rely on ‘the kind of undifferentiated, generalized
grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to
countenance in the past.’ ”53 This conception of the case in the majority
opinion allowed the Court to dismiss the relevance of the mathematical analysis.54
51. Whitford IV, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–30 (2018) (citations omitted). The Court further explained:
[Lead plaintiff Whitford] testified that he lives in Madison in the 76th
Assembly District, and acknowledged on cross-examination that this is,
under any plausible circumstances, a heavily Democratic district. Under
Act 43, the Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford’s district
is 81.9%; under the plaintiffs’ ideal map—their Demonstration Plan—
the projected Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford’s district would be 82%. Whitford therefore conceded that Act 43 had not “affected [his] ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in [his] district.”
Whitford testified that he had nevertheless suffered a harm “relate[d] to
[his] ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the
Assembly and the Senate.” As he explained, “[t]he only practical way to
accomplish my policy objectives is to get a majority of the Democrats in
the Assembly and the Senate ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer.”
Id. at 1924–25 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 1930 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)) (“For similar reasons, we have held that a plaintiff who alleges that he is the object of a racial
gerrymander—a drawing of district lines on the basis of race—has standing to
assert only that his own district has been so gerrymandered.”).
53. Id. (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007)).
54. See id. (“The plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that the ‘efficiency gap captures in a single number all of a district plan’s cracking and packing.’ That number is calculated by subtracting the statewide sum of one party’s wasted votes
from the statewide sum of the other party’s wasted votes and dividing the result
by the statewide sum of all votes cast, where ‘wasted votes’ are defined as all
votes cast for a losing candidate and all votes cast for a winning candidate beyond
the 50% plus one that ensures victory. The larger the number produced by that
calculation, the greater the asymmetry between the parties in their efficiency in
converting votes into legislative seats. Though they take no firm position on the
matter, the plaintiffs have suggested that an efficiency gap in the range of 7% to
10% should trigger constitutional scrutiny. . . . We need not doubt the plaintiffs’
math. The difficulty for standing purposes is that these calculations are an average measure. They do not address the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes
of particular citizens. Partisan-asymmetry metrics such as the efficiency gap
measure something else entirely: the effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties. . . . That shortcoming confirms the fundamental problem with the plaintiffs’ case as presented on this record. It is a case about group
political interests, not individual legal rights. But this Court is not responsible
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A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kagan and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, agrees with this standing
analysis but provides further guidance for future plaintiffs making a
claims of individualized vote dilution and of associational harm, both
of which might be founded on the types of statistical methodologies
presented by the Whitford plaintiffs.55
More specifically, Justice Kagan explains that:
To have standing to bring a partisan gerrymandering claim based on vote dilution, then, a plaintiff must prove that the value of her own vote has been
“contract[ed].” . . . Consider the perfect form of each variety. When a voter
resides in a packed district, her preferred candidate will win no matter what;
when a voter lives in a cracked district, her chosen candidate stands no chance
of prevailing. But either way, such a citizen’s vote carries less weight—has
less consequence—than it would under a neutrally drawn map. So when she
shows that her district has been packed or cracked, she proves, as she must to
establish standing, that she is “among the injured.”56

Importantly for our purposes, Justice Kagan elucidates: “Among other
ways of proving packing or cracking, a plaintiff could produce an alternative map (or set of alternative maps)—comparably consistent with
traditional districting principles—under which her vote would carry
more weight.”57 In other words, Justice Kagan would look for precisely
the kind of mapping and statistical analyses presented in Whitford.58

55.

56.
57.

58.

for vindicating generalized partisan preferences. The Court’s constitutionally
prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the people appearing before
it.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“I write to address in more detail what kind of
evidence the present plaintiffs (or any additional ones) must offer to support that
allegation. And I write to make some observations about what would happen if
they succeed in proving standing—that is, about how their vote dilution case
could then proceed on the merits.”).
Id. at 1935–36 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1936. Justice Kagan further explains that:
Here, the Court is right that the plaintiffs have so far failed to make
such a showing. William Whitford was the only plaintiff to testify at trial
about the alleged gerrymander’s effects. He expressly acknowledged that
his district would be materially identical under any conceivable map,
whether or not drawn to achieve partisan advantage. That means Wisconsin’s plan could not have diluted Whitford’s own vote. So whatever
other claims he might have, Whitford is not “among the injured” in a
vote dilution challenge. Four other plaintiffs differed from Whitford by
alleging in the complaint that they lived in packed or cracked districts.
But for whatever reason, they failed to back up those allegations with
evidence as the suit proceeded. So they too did not show the injury—a
less valuable vote—central to their vote dilution theory.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563
(1992)).
But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2503–04 (2019) (“Even the
most sophisticated districting maps cannot reliably account for some of the reasons voters prefer one candidate over another, or why their preferences may
change. Voters elect individual candidates in individual districts, and their selections depend on the issues that matter to them, the quality of the candidates, the
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Justice Kagan goes on to address a claim based on infringement of
the First Amendment right of association—which would not hinge on
a showing of vote dilution based on cracking or packing—finding that
“the plaintiffs’ evidence of partisan asymmetry well fits a suit alleging
associational injury.”59 She concludes that although the First Amendment claim was not fleshed out enough to avoid dismissal for lack of
standing, since the statistical proof of partisan asymmetry best measures “a gerrymander’s effect ‘on the fortunes of political parties’ and
those associated with them,” the evidence “could easily have supported the alternative theory of associational harm.”60
Thus, while Rucho61 has abrogated judicial limits on partisan gerrymandering cases for the moment, racial gerrymandering and other
cases that raise similar analyses may yet find a salutary reception at
the Court. We now turn to unpacking those statistical analyses in
Whitford.
III. THE MATH
The efficiency gap study presented in the complaint—the essential
piece of mathematical analysis that underpins the plaintiffs’ arguments—was conducted and authored by Kenneth Mayer, a professor
of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.62
Professor Mayer based his mathematical analysis on the efficiency
gap—a term for the number of wasted voters of one party compared to
another.63 The efficiency gap compares how effectively the parties
translate votes into seats—when a party has a high efficiency gap, the
percentage of seats won is significantly higher than the percentage of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the performance of an incumbent, national
events or local issues that drive voter turnout, and other considerations. Many
voters split their tickets. Others never register with a political party, and vote for
candidates from both major parties at different points during their lifetimes. For
all of those reasons, asking judges to predict how a particular districting map will
perform in future elections risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable
ground outside judicial expertise.”). As in Whitford, Chief Justice Roberts, who
authored the majority opinion, continues in Rucho to question the ability of the
judiciary to cope with the mathematical underpinnings of partisan gerrymandering litigation, despite broad judicial acceptance of the necessary multivariable
regression techniques, as discussed in Part III of this Article.
Whitford IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1937–39 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1939.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484.
Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 1.
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 30, at 831.
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the total votes received.64 An efficiency gap of zero would mean that
the parties had the same number of wasted votes.65
Professor Mayer analyzed the 2012 Presidential vote in Wisconsin
to determine the efficiency gap of the Act 43 map. He explained that:
Instead of estimating future election results for an existing or proposed hypothetical plan, [his] goal was to determine whether it was possible to draw a
district plan following the 2010 Census that minimized the efficiency gap
while maintaining strict fidelity to the federal and state constitutional requirements of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and compliance with the Voting Rights Act.66

He used reliable statistical methodologies to draw a hypothetical map
and determined the efficiency gap for the hypothetical map in the
2012 election.67 In doing so, he demonstrated that the Act 43 electoral
map was politically skewed and how applied mathematics can inform
political decision-making. This section describes the structure of his
analysis.
A.

Overview

To create a new, hypothetical electoral map, Professor Mayer
moved wards into different districts—or, to think about it another
64. Id. at 853 (“Beyond its positive and normative appeal, the efficiency gap has a
number of useful properties that warrant discussion. First, under circumstances
that are very common in US [sic] elections, it is unnecessary to sum the wasted
votes in each individual district—a process that can be somewhat cumbersome.
Instead, if we assume that all districts are equal in population (which is constitutionally required), and that there are only two parties (which is typical in [singlemember district] systems), then the computation reduces through simple algebra
to something quite straightforward: Efficiency Gap = Seat Margin – (2 × Vote
Margin)[.] In this formula, ‘Seat Margin’ is the share of all seats held by a party,
minus 50 percent. ‘Vote Margin’ is the same for votes: the share received by a
party, minus 50 percent. A party has an electoral advantage when the efficiency
gap is positive, and a disadvantage when it is negative. When the number is
equal to zero, there is no efficiency gap and so no partisan benefit derived from
redistricting.” (footnotes omitted)).
65. Though an efficiency gap is unlikely to ever be precisely zero, the measure delineates negative numbers as reflecting a higher number of wasted votes for Democrats, and positive numbers reflect a higher number of wasted votes for
Republicans. See id. at 849; Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 3
(“The efficiency gap is an ‘excess seats’ measure, reflecting the nature of a partisan gerrymander. An efficiency gap in favor of one party sees it wasting fewer
votes than its opponent, thus translating its votes across the jurisdiction into
seats more efficiently than its opponent. This results in the party winning more
seats than expected, given its vote share (V) and if wasted vote rates were the
same between the parties. EG = 0 corresponds to no efficiency gap between the
parties, or no partisan difference in wasted vote rates. In this analysis (but without loss of generality) EG is normed such that negative EG values indicate higher
wasted vote rates for Democrats relative to Republicans, and EG > 0 the
converse.”).
66. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 6.
67. Id.
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way, drew the lines of the Congressional districts to include wards in
new assembly districts. One benefit to working at the ward level when
analyzing voting behavior is that each ward contains a small number
of people (and therefore, voters), allowing greater precision when
drawing the new electoral map. Since Mayer worked with smaller
base units of voters, he was able to more accurately place voters into
hypothetical electoral boundaries.68
Wisconsin has ninety-nine assembly districts, each of which elects
a state representative. Each district has between 24 and 135 wards
and wards each have an average of 869 people.69 Professor Mayer created a regression model for assembly votes based on the 2012 voting
data. However, Mayer could not simply count the number of votes in
the new district based on the votes cast in each ward. Crucially, some
assembly districts had uncontested elections, which would skew the
statistical data.70 In many cases, an assembly district with an uncontested race might indicate a heavily partisan district—but also might
indicate that the ward was involved in cracking or packing. To avoid
this issue, Professor Mayer created a regression model based on the
2012 votes to predict how people would have voted in 2012 under a
different electoral map.
B.

Simple Linear Regression

In statistics, a linear regression model asks predictive questions
about future behavior based on characteristics, which researchers describe as variables. For example, a linear model between two variables, the effect of hours of sleep on “level of grumpiness,” might
appear as follows:71

68. Id. at 8–9. Although statistical analysis is typically built on large numbers, the
smaller the base unit of the analysis, the more accurate the calculations. PHILIP
H. POLLOCK III, THE ESSENTIALS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 27 (5th ed. 2016).
69. See generally Legis. Tech. Servs. Bureau, Wisconsin Legislative Map Library,
WIS. STATE LEGISLATURE, https://legis.wisconsin.gov/ltsb/gis/maps/ [https://
perma.cc/3AU3-8WNU] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
70. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 5.
71. DANIELLE NAVARRO, Linear Regression, in LEARNING STATISTICS WITH R: A TUTORIAL FOR PSYCHOLOGY STUDENTS AND OTHER BEGINNERS chapter 15 (Emily Kothe
trans., 2019), https://learningstatisticswithr.com/book/regression.html [https://
perma.cc/ZPU4-XMBX].
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In this experiment, the researcher noted how many hours they
slept and then also took note of their perceived level of grumpiness on
a scale of zero to 100.72 The researcher collected these data points over
time, and then documented them in the above graph. The regression
line is the line that best fits the data points. The researcher is looking
for the line that runs through each of the data points, minimizing the
distance between the line and the data point for all the data points.73
This line is the most common way of using the collected data to predict
future grumpiness levels based on hours of sleep.
The equation, y = a + b(x), expresses the regression model, where x
is the independent variable (number of hours of sleep), y is the dependent variable (grumpiness), and b is the slope of the line. In the above
equation, the slope of the line will be negative—as the number of
hours of sleep increase, grumpiness decreases. The letter a is the yintercept, representing the level of grumpiness if the person were to
get no sleep at all. So given this equation, a person can plug in any

72. Id. at fig. 15.1.
73. More specifically, the least squares regression line is one that minimizes the sum
of the squared vertical distances from each individual data point to the line.
SAMPRIT CHATTERGEE & ALI S. HADI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS BY EXAMPLE 33 (5th
ed. 2012). These vertical distances represent “errors” or “residuals” in the predicted (or “fitted”) verse actual data points. Id. The least squares regression line,
then, is the line that minimizes the sum of these squared errors. Id. at 34. By
design, the vertical distances sum to zero which means the sum of the vertical
distances above the line equal the sum of the vertical distances below the line. Id.
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number for x, the number of hours of sleep, to predict the level of
grumpiness.74
Variance is a mathematical term for the spread in a data set;
higher levels of variance make the data prediction less accurate.75
Some variables—like sleep and grumpiness—may be strongly correlated, which means that one variable can explain the other. Some
variables are not related at all. A linear regression line is most accurate when looking at data between two variables that are strongly related to one another—strong correlation and low variance means the
predictive power of the data is higher.76
Variance is often calculated using a least squares regression,
which minimizes the distance between each point of a scatterplot and
the generated line.77 Given any set of data, there exists one line that
minimizes this distance. The generated least squares regression line
thus has the lowest level of variance possible given the data points,
and in this way, it is the best fit for the data.78
74. Note that the relationship is associational and not necessary causal. It might be
that the lack of sleep is caused by other factors (e.g. pressure at work), and these
are direct causes of the grumpiness, not lack of sleep. Regression is not, in and of
itself, able to identify causal relationships. See D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of
Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1994 (2001) (explaining linear regression equation in the
context of market share litigation).
75. Trend (Regression) Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE DESKBOOK § 1:24
(James W. Conrad, Jr. ed., 2020) Westlaw (“A line can be fit through any series of
points. The important question is whether the slope and direction of the line illustrate some meaningful correlation between the two variables, or whether the line
is merely a function of chance. . . . The evaluation involves testing how close the
measured data values equal the values that would be predicted by the regression
line. These residuals (differences) are expected to be normally distributed, with a
mean of zero and a constant variance. . . . [T]he null hypothesis is assumed (typically, that the slope (m) is zero, which would mean that the dependent variable is
not changing as the independent variable changes). One then asks how likely it
would be that the observed variance would occur if the dependent variable was
not changing in some relationship with the independent variable. A t-distribution
is generally used to answer this question, because it yields the interval that
would contain the variance at a given level of confidence. Typically, a 95-percent
confidence level is used; the higher the level used, the smaller the variance must
be for the slope to be significant.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. See generally POLLOCK III, supra note 68, at 183–241.
78. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., The Basics of Multiple Regression, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY app. 6A
(2020) (“A regression line is the best-fitting straight line through a set of points in
a scatterplot. . . . The regression line typically is estimated using the standard
method of least-squares, where the values of a and b are calculated so that the
sum of the squared deviations of the points from the line are minimized. In this
way, positive deviations and negative deviations of equal size are counted
equally, and large deviations are counted more [than] small deviations.”). See
generally POLLOCK III, supra note 68, at 183–241.
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Multivariable Regression

In research like Professor Mayer’s, scientists analyze how a dependent variable relates to many different interrelated independent variables. When trying to find a regression equation to determine voting
patterns, scientists must consider how votes, the dependent variable,
relate to the many different variables that play a part in determining
how those votes are cast.79
A multivariable regression80 looks at how those independent variables correlate to the dependent variable. Statistical software can examine many data points, even with many different characteristics,
and produce a predictive equation that considers all the variables. The
software will generate an equation like the one utilized in simple linear regression, but with more independent variables: y = a + bi(xi). In

79. Multivariable regression is well accepted as a tool in judicial decisions. See
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 305–06 (3d ed. 2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/
13163/chapter/8 [http://perma.cc/2JY7-SGM7] (“Multiple regression analysis is a
statistical tool for understanding the relationship between two or more variables.
Multiple regression involves a variable to be explained—called the dependent variable—and additional explanatory variables that are thought to produce or be
associated with changes in the dependent variable. For example, a multiple regression analysis might estimate the effect of the number of years of work on
salary. Salary would be the dependent variable to be explained; years of experience would be the explanatory variable. Multiple regression analysis is sometimes well suited to the analysis of data about competing theories in which there
are several possible explanations for the relationship among a number of explanatory variables. Multiple regression typically uses a single dependent variable
and several explanatory variables to assess the statistical data pertinent to these
theories. In a case alleging sex discrimination in salaries, for example, a multiple
regression analysis would examine not only sex, but also other explanatory variables of interest, such as education and experience. The employer–defendant
might use multiple regression to argue that salary is a function of the employee’s
education and experience, and the employee–plaintiff might argue that salary is
also a function of the individual’s sex. Multiple regression also may be useful (1)
in determining whether a particular effect is present; (2) in measuring the magnitude of a particular effect; and (3) in forecasting what a particular effect would
be, but for an intervening event.” (footnotes omitted)).
80. Multivariable regression is sometimes inappropriately described as multivariate
regression; however, the latter is a more complicated field of statistical analysis.
See Bertha Hidalgo & Melody Goodman, Multivariate or Multivariable Regression?, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 39 ( 2013) (explaining that either a single or multivariable regression model “has a single outcome variable and [one] or more
independent or predictor variables. Multivariate, by contrast, refers to the modeling of data that are often derived from longitudinal studies, wherein an outcome
is measured for the same individual at multiple time points (repeated measures),
or the modeling of nested/clustered data, wherein there are multiple individuals
in each cluster”).
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the multivariable equation, n represents the variable, and each variable will have a coefficient multiplied by the value of that variable.81
Statistical software will create the most accurate equation possible
given the diversity of the input and report whether each variable coefficient is statistically significant. If it is, then the software has concluded that coefficient may be an important predictor in determining
the outcome, based on the data given.82
For example, statistical software would analyze the sleep and
grumpiness data above and determine the equation y = 125.6 +
(–8.94)x to describe that relationship.83 In real terms, a person might
have a grumpiness level of 125.6 with no sleep. But each hour of sleep
decreases that level by 8.94 points—so with eight hours of sleep, the
same person would have a grumpiness level of 54.08. Now imagine
that we take other variables into account to determine grumpiness
level—like stress at work. In a multivariable analysis, the software
will create a precise equation for all variables and at the same time,
will determine whether each coefficient is accurately predictive.
In other words, the software will tell you if the (–8.94) above is
sufficiently different from zero to indicate the likelihood that the relationship between sleep and grumpiness is real. This evaluation of the
difference from zero or a null effect is called statistical significance—if
the coefficient is sufficiently different from zero, it means that the coefficient may be predictive based on the analyzed data.84
81. See id. 39–40. Choice of both the independent and dependent variables is critical
to reliability of the regression results. See, e.g., 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 78,
§ 6:17 (“It is essential in multiple regression analysis that the explanatory variable of interest [the dependent variable] not be correlated perfectly with one or
more of the other explanatory variables [the independent variables]. If there were
perfect correlation between two variables, the expert could not separate out the
effect of the variable of interest on the dependent variable from the effect of the
other variable. Suppose, for example, that in a sex discrimination suit a particular form of job experience is determined to be a valid source of high wages. If all
men had the requisite job experience and all women did not, it would be impossible to tell whether wage differentials between men and women were due to sex
discrimination or differences in experience.”).
82. See POLLOCK III, supra note 68, at 156–79.
83. NAVARRO, supra note 71.
84. NAVARRO, supra note 71; see also RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & JASON R. BENT, THE
STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 6:7 (2020) (“The individual regression coefficients are
weights attached to the predictor variables; for example, the coefficient of the sex
variable in our example (-$321) is the weight explicitly attached to being female
for the community college’s compensation model. Assuming that individual coefficients can be interpreted without error, it is of interest whether this coefficient is
significantly different from zero. If the coefficient is not significantly different
from zero, then sex can be viewed as playing no role in the community college’s
compensation system. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero, then a
community college teacher’s sex would appear to be associated with that teacher’s
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Thus, based on the statistical software’s information, we can determine if the data analyzed is adequate to predict future behavior. This
approach is the basic premise of Mayer’s analysis. He compiled voting
data based on many different characteristics, then used statistical
software to predict voting behavior—not in future elections, but in a
hypothetical 2012 election where the district boundaries were drawn
differently.
D.

A Hypothetical Voter

Think about a hypothetical voter living in hypothetical Wisconsin
assembly district 1. That district may have many characteristics:
wealthy, diverse, or politically polarized, for example. Perhaps the district is so heavily partisan that most races go uncontested. Such factors may affect how our hypothetical voter collectively votes at every
political level—local, state, and national. In 2012, such a Wisconsin
voter cast ballots for representatives in the city, county, assembly district, United States House of Representatives, United States Senate,
and Presidency. For each race, a certain number of people voted for
each candidate on the ballot. These are specific vote totals.
Now, imagine that assembly district 1 included more or fewer
neighborhoods. Imagine how different the assembly district might
look if it included other voters. Our hypothetical voter might no longer
be voting with people who are wealthy, diverse, or belonging to the
same party. These changes might—and almost certainly would—affect the specific vote totals in assembly district 1.
To understand Mayer’s equation, the hypothetical voter is an effective way to conceptualize the relationship between voter characteristics and vote totals. In his model, the dependent variable is the
specific vote totals—the number of votes received—for each 2012 assembly candidate. This number is dependent on the other variables,
specifically, the characteristics of voters in each ward that makes up
the assembly district. These characteristics are independent variables.
Mayer analyzed eight independent variables, categorized in four
types: district demographics, underlying partisanship, incumbency,
and fixed geographic effects:85
compensation level, so that males tend to earn, on average, $321 more than females.” (footnotes omitted)).
85. These variables were chosen because they have been shown to reliably affect how
votes are cast. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 11. For experts
making choices about these variables, lawyers often can add value, questioning
the basis for each choice of input to the model, and ensuring that each can be
factually supported and withstand cross-examination. See, e.g., Spaulding v.
Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Thus, the weight of statistical
proof relies implicitly on ‘the existence of proper supportive facts and the absence
of variables which would undermine the reasonableness of the inference of discrimination.’” (quoting White v. City of San Diego, 605 F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The eligible number of voters in a ward, as measured by the 2010 census;
The voting eligible Black population in a ward;
The voting eligible Hispanic population in a ward;86
The Number of votes cast for Barack Obama [the Democrat] in the 2012
Presidential election in a ward;
(5) The Number of Votes cast for Mitt Romney [the Republican] in the 2012
Presidential election in a ward;87
1979))); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1313 n.8 (10th Cir.
1999) (explaining that an analysis that fails to account for “important variations”
might create “statistical anomalies that are not really probative”); Gallaway v.
Empire Fire & Marine Ins., No. 03-113, 2007 WL 1199502 (W.D. La. Apr. 20,
2007), aff’d, Medlin v. Newman, 255 F. App’x 892 (5th Cir. 2007) (providing an
example of a draconian sanction rendered after inappropriate modeling). In Gallaway, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been “engulfed” by a “cloud” of hydrochloric acid (HCl) fumes after a truck carrying liquid HCl was involved in an
accident that caused acid to leak from the truck. Id. at *2. Although no one disputed that some level of fumes was present at the accident, absent defensive
modeling efforts, the plaintiffs’ testimony of their exposure might have gone unchallenged. Id. at *2–3. However, an air dispersion model used by emergency responders to predict chemical dispersion after an accidental release showed that
the plaintiffs “could not have been exposed to harmful levels of HCl such that
would have caused their alleged chronic symptoms.” Id. at *3. The court was persuaded that the defense expert who presented the model had reviewed available
factual information about the event, including meteorological records and emergency response reports, and had made appropriate inputs to the model regarding—among other things—the amount of chemical spilled, the location of the
chemical source, the duration of the spill, and the position of the plaintiffs relative to that source. Id. Because the plaintiffs did not present any evidence to
counter the defendants’ model, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Id.; see also Thomas C.
Redman, If Your Data Is Bad, Your Machine Learning Tools Are Useless, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/if-your-data-is-bad-your-machine-learning-tools-are-useless [https://perma.cc/94V6-MWTL] (setting forth
five steps to ensure for a well-executed quality program for analyzing data).
86. More specifically, Mayer explains that:
Total VEP [Voting Eligible Population] constitutes a baseline of the size
of the voting population, reflecting the fact that the number of votes will
be a function of total population. Black and Hispanic VEP are additional
controls that reflect the partisan tendencies of key subpopulations as
well as turnout likelihood. Traditionally, both African American and
Hispanic populations vote at lower rates tha[n] whites, although in 2012
African American turnout was comparable to white turnout. Hispanic
populations vote at lower rates than other demographic groups, in part
because of a higher noncitizen population, but also because of socioeconomic factors known to reduce turnout.
Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 12–13.
87. Presidential voting is an important variable because:
The presidential vote is widely used as an exogenous measure of district
level partisanship, and it correlates very strongly with other more complex measures of partisan strength.
The presidential vote is, not surprisingly, an extremely strong predictor of the legislative vote. If we know how many votes were cast for the
Republican presidential candidate in a ward we will have a very good
idea, subject to some conditions, of how many votes will be cast for the
Republican candidate in the legislative election in that ward. While not
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(6)Whether the Assembly election in the ward has a Democratic incumbent;
(7) Whether the Assembly election in the ward has a Republican
incumbent;88
(8) A set of geographic effects for each county.89
everyone who votes for the Republican presidential candidate will vote
for the Republican state legislative candidate, nearly all will, and we can
precisely quantify the nature of that relationship.
....
An important property of the presidential vote as an independent variable in this model is that it can be treated as exogenous to (i.e., not
caused by) the legislative vote. Exogeneity can be described in two ways.
The first is in causal terms. Most voters will vote for the same party for
the president and state Assembly. . . . These voters are consistent because they are Democrats or Republicans, and partisanship is the factor
that explains both vote choices. Other voters will make their Assembly
choice based on their presidential vote, because they use party labels as
a cue when voting in a down-ticket race. “[P]arties are generally known
by the presidential candidates they nominate, and candidates for state
legislative races are a good deal less well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential coattails.” Few voters, if any
at all, will decide on an Assembly candidate first and then vote for president on the basis of their Assembly vote preference. The causal arrow
runs from the presidential vote to the Assembly vote, not from the Assembly vote to the presidential vote. This is why we speak of presidential
coattails affecting legislative races, and not the other way around.
The second reason why the presidential vote is exogenous to the Assembly vote is that it is not affected by local district-level conditions such
as incumbency, spending, or candidate quality. The broader factors that
influence the presidential vote, and the presidential candidates themselves, are the same in every Assembly district. The presidential vote is
affected by underlying partisanship, national conditions and the characteristics of the presidential candidates, factors that are constant whether
that vote is aggregated at the state, district, or ward levels.
Id. at 13, 16–17 (citations omitted) (quoting James E. Campbell, Presidential
Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
45, 46 (1986)).
88. Professor Mayer stated:
The incumbency advantage is perhaps the most well-known feature
of contemporary legislative elections. Legislative incumbents rarely lose,
and usually win by large margins. All other things being equal, an incumbent will get more votes than a non-incumbent. The causes of this
advantage are less important in this context than its magnitude. The
model takes into account the incumbency advantage by noting whether
an incumbent is running in an Assembly district.
Incumbency effects are measured with a dummy variable equal to
[one] when a candidate is an incumbent, and [zero] otherwise, multiplied
by the ward voting eligible population to create an interactive variable
that accounts for differences in size from one ward to the next. Since the
dependent variable is an actual vote count, the value of incumbency—in
terms of how many additional votes incumbents receive—will vary with
the number of voters who reside in a ward.
Id. at 17–18 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
89. Professor Mayer explained:
The last set of variables estimate the effect that county geography has on
the Assembly vote. Some counties in Wisconsin are heavily Republican
and some heavily Democratic. It is possible that a voters’ county of resi-
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Professor Mayer calculated the assembly vote total for each ward
twice—once for the Democratic vote total and once for the Republican
vote total and explained the assembly vote as a function of these eight
variables.
Importantly, however, Mayer did not just look at the vote totals in
each ward, redraw the political districts, and tally up the number of
votes in each ward. To better understand why that is, imagine this
rectangle represents voting districts. District 1 includes four wards:
A–D. District 2 includes two wards: E and F.
Assembly District 1 – 750 Votes

Assembly District 2 –
400 Votes
Ward A:
Ward B:
Ward C:
Ward D:
Ward E:
Ward F:
200 Votes
100 Votes 100 Votes 200 Votes 350 Votes 200 Votes

Now assume ward D is moved into assembly district 2. It might be
tempting simply to shift the 350 votes in ward D out of district 1 and
into district 2. However, this choice would be inappropriate, because it
would ignore the fact that voting totals are a product of the characteristics of that district—and thus require a more fulsome analysis.
While the number of votes cast will likely remain relatively unchanged if ward D is pushed into district 2, the multivariable regression equation ensures that any differences in the independent
variables prevalent in ward D are considered.
The beauty of models is that they can be tested. In his analysis,
Professor Mayer first used the efficiency gap model he created to predict the 2012 vote with the Act 43 districting plan; in other words, he
compared the model’s results with the actual results. The model was
extremely accurate, correctly predicting the winner in seventy of seventy-two districts. In the two incorrect districts, the Republican candidates received 51.9% and 49.7% of the vote, with an average absolute
error in the vote margin of 1.49%.90 Importantly, by confirming the
dence could have an effect on the vote choice, whether because of sorting,
socialization or assimilation, or other unobserved effects.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 24–25.
As important as the prediction of actual district vote totals is the
model’s ability to accurately identify the winner, as the efficiency gap
calculation is sensitive to the party of the winners and losers. . . .
....
These results, which compare predicted election results to the actual
election results, demonstrate that the model is very accurate. A harder
test involves the accuracy of predictions using data not in the sample—
that is, applying the model to data and election results that are different
from the data used to estimate the model. . . .
. . . [The figure showing] actual versus predicted vote totals . . . are
not grouped as tightly . . . but still show a very high degree of accuracy.
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accuracy of his model, Mayer validated his choices and calculations of
independent variables. The next step in the process: test the application of the model with a different districting plan, as if Act 43 were not
enacted.
E.

A Demonstration District Plan

Professor Mayer created a different districting plan for the 2012
election—one he designed to work within constitutional requirements
to draw a non-partisan map.91 To do this, he evaluated each census
block within a specific ward. Wisconsin census blocks have between
zero and 2,988 eligible voters, with an average of seventeen,92 and
each ward is comprised of approximately forty census blocks. Mayer
determined the census block-level voting characteristics, using the
same eight independent variables as his earlier analysis, and entered
the data into Maptitude, a commercial redistricting software.93
Within the state and federal constitutional parameters of “equal population, continuity, compactness, and respect for political subdivisions,”
Mayer created a redistricting plan that minimized the efficiency gap
and maximized competitive districts.94
Professor Mayer then analyzed the voting data to create an equation to predict the outcome of the 2012 vote under different electoral
maps. He did not create the equation to predict future votes; rather,
he created an equation to predict how the vote would have occurred if
the Wisconsin Legislature never enacted Act 43. He found that the
demonstration plan resulted in an efficiency gap of just 2.2%, more
than five times lower than the Act 43 efficiency gap of 11.69%.95 Professor Mayer concluded that:

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

The model does an excellent job accurately forecasting vote totals and
election results, and provides a solid foundation for estimating hypothetical vote totals in an alternative district plan.
Id. at 23–28 (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 6. Constitutional guidelines for district creation require each district to be
as equal in population to all other districts in the state “as practicable,” while the
boundaries and parameters of the districts should adhere to traditional districting principles like compactness and contiguity. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 31.
Id. Specifically, Mayer used Maptitude for Redistricting 2013, Build 2060. Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 45 (summarizing data as “show[ing] that the Demonstration Plan results in
741,984 wasted Democratic votes . . . obtained by adding the number of lost Democratic votes cast for losing candidates . . . and the number of surplus Democratic
votes cast for winners above what was necessary to win . . . . The same calculation
for Republicans . . . results in 689,570 wasted Republican votes. The difference
between these two numbers, 781,984 – 689,570 = 62,414 net wasted Democratic
votes. Dividing 62,414 by the predicted total number of votes 2,843,108, produces
the baseline efficiency gap for [the] plan, 0.0220, or 2.20%. Table 8 . . . shows the
same calculation for Act 43 districts, using estimated partisan vote totals with
incumbent advantages removed. Act 43 resulted in a total of 332,552 net wasted
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The results demonstrate that Act 43 was an egregious gerrymander, packing
Democratic voters into a small number of districts and distributing Republican voters efficiently in a large number of districts in which they constituted
safe majorities. . . . [A]reas of Democratic strength large enough to constitute
majorities in single districts were unnecessarily split and then combined with
larger Republican populations to create additional Republican districts and
eliminate Democratic districts. . . . This packing and cracking was so successful that Republicans won 61% of Assembly seats in 2012, while obtaining only
46.5% of the statewide presidential vote.96

F.

Permanence of the Efficiency Gap

We return now to the effect of the efficiency gap present in the
Wisconsin data and the seven percent threshold that so vexed Chief
Justice Roberts. Simon Jackman, then a professor of political science
at Stanford University, built on Mayer’s work to further explain the
efficiency gap, comparing the Wisconsin districting plan to other legislative maps to show it was gerrymandered.97 In his analysis, he compares the Wisconsin districts against legislative maps in other states
across the United States to show that the Republican version of the
Wisconsin map (Act 43) was an outlier.98 He takes the argument a
step further by calculating the efficiency gap of legislative districting
plans across multiple elections to show that a legislative districting
plan like the one in Wisconsin can have a sustained effect of disproportionately allocating legislative seats. Therefore, the gerrymandering could not be explained away based on the vagaries of one
election.99
Professor Jackman likewise analyzed the level of wasted votes, so
critical to the efficiency gap approach, concluding that: “To be sure,
both parties are wasting votes. But partisan advantage ensues when
one part is wasting fewer votes than the other, or, equivalently, more
efficiently translating votes into seats.”100 While he boils down the efficiency gap as a measure of excess seats, his analysis takes on some
complexity when he describes the “seats-vote” curve, which is his way
of saying the proportion of legislative seats to votes in an election.101
Jackman points out that seat totals are not directly proportional even

96.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Democratic votes. The efficiency gap of Act 43 is 11.69%, more than five times
larger than the Demonstration Plan.”).
Id. at 54.
Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 1. Since April 2016, Professor
Jackman has been a professor of political science and chief executive officer of the
United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney in his native Australia.
Professor Simon Jackman, U.S. STUD. CTR., https://www.ussc.edu.au/people/simon-jackman [https://perma.cc/ZZT6-M84M] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40 at 69.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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with a legislative map with no efficiency gap—a party will not win
fifteen percent of seats in a legislative body by winning fifteen percent
of the statewide vote. Rather, Professor Jackson points out that—assuming a two-candidate election—a party must win fifty-one percent
of the vote in a district to win a seat in the legislature.102
The crux of his analysis examines numerous districting plans in
various states over a number of years, comparing the extent to which
their efficiency gaps diverge from zero.103 More specifically, Professor
Jackman calculated the efficiency gap in state legislative elections
from 1972 to 2014, examining data from 83,269 district-level state legislative contests from 786 elections in forty-one states.104 He then
compared the Wisconsin efficiency gap against these measures to
show the effect of the Act 43 plan.

102. Id.
103. See POLLOCK III, supra note 68, at 133.
104. Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 15.
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On the graph of all efficiency gaps in the elections in the comparison, Wisconsin’s 2012 and 2014 are numbered squares 2 and 1, respectively.105 The diagonal line represents an efficiency gap of zero (equal
amount of wasted Democratic and Republican votes).106 He concluded:
The historical analysis reported above supports the proposition that Wisconsin’s EG scores are likely to endure over the course of the plan. Few states
ever record EG scores as large as those observed in Wisconsin; indeed, there is
virtually no precedent for the lop-sided, two election sequence of EG scores
generated in Wisconsin in 2012 and 2014 in the data [he] analyze[d] here
(1972–2014). The closest historical analogs suggest that a districting plan that
generates an opening, two-election sequence of EG scores like those from Wisconsin will continue to do so, generating seat shares for Democrats that are
well below those we would expect from a neutral plan.107

Professor Jackman also discusses pinpointing the efficiency gap for
a districting plan that will likely ensure the district remains uncompetitive until the next ten-year census.108 His analysis attempts to find
the threshold number for the efficiency gap—how many votes need to
be packed into a district to ensure that the party continues to win
elections in the district, thus making the district uncompetitive for the
foreseeable future. He concluded, based on the data, that “an efficiency gap above 7% in any districting plan’s first election year will
continue to favor that party for the life of the plan.”109 Professor Jack105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 9, 70 fig. 34.
Id. at 71.
Professor Jackman was cautious in reaching this result:
We do need to be careful when making these kinds of relative assessments about the magnitude of the efficiency gap. If pro-Republican gerrymandering is widespread, then it will be less unusual to see a large,
negative EG estimate, at least contemporaneously; in fact this appears
to the case in the post-2010 set of elections, where the longer-term distinctiveness of the Wisconsin numbers is matched and in some cases exceeded by other states also recording unusually large, negative EG
estimates (e.g., Florida, Michigan, Virginia and North Carolina). This
speaks to the utility of the longer-term, historical analysis in other research and in this report. It is important to remember that EG = 0 corresponds to a partisan symmetry in wasted vote rates; we should be wary
of arguments that would lead us to tolerate small to moderate levels of
the efficiency gap because they appear to be the norm in some period of
time, or in some set of jurisdictions.
Id. at 65 (alterations in original) (citing Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note
30).
109. Whitford III, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 905 (W.D. Wis. 2016). As explained by the
district court:
First, Professor Jackman compared districting plans across a wide variety of states, and determined that over 95% of plans with an EG of at
least 7% will never have an EG that favors the opposite party. Second,
Professor Jackman conducted a “swing analysis” of all redistricting
plans since 2010 and determined that nearly all plans that resulted in a
7% efficiency gap favoring one party in the first election year will retain
an efficiency gap that favors that same party, even when one adjusts a
party’s statewide vote share by five points.
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man estimated Wisconsin’s efficiency gap was –.13 (thirteen percent
more favorable to Republican candidates) in 2012 and –.10 (ten percent more favorable to Republican candidates) in 2014.110
G.

What Does It All Mean?

It is important to understand the purpose of these analyses to understand what they tell us. Professor Mayer created a mathematical
equation to accurately predict the voting totals at the ward level
across the state in 2012, which allowed him to draw up different electoral maps to simulate the 2012 Presidential vote using those new
maps and thereby show the Act 43 electoral map was purposefully gerrymandered.111 By creating an electoral map where each party won
seats proportional to their percentage of the overall vote totals—that
districts could be drawn so there was no efficiency gap at all (or only a
small one)—Mayer was able to show that the decision to select a map
with such a high efficiency gap, one that could (and did) benefit the
party drawing the map, was deliberate. In short, the presence of a
large efficiency gap is evidence of a gerrymandered map.
Similarly, Professor Jackman evaluated efficiency gaps over a
broad set of electoral data spanning over forty years. After comparing
Wisconsin’s election results under Act 43 to this expansive dataset, he
concluded that there was “no precedent” for the Act 43 election results, and thus the Act 43 map likely was gerrymandered. Jackman
also used the data comparison to determine that any map with an efficiency gap of more than seven percent—when one political party is
utilizing its votes at least seven percent more efficiently than the
other—is both gerrymandered and likely to dictate outcomes until
electoral maps are redrawn, presumably no sooner than the next cen....
. . . Professor Jackman observed that, even with a 5% swing in the
Democrats’ favor, the EG would not drop below 7%.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Jackman himself stated:
This analysis points to a benchmark of about –.06 or –.07 as the actionable threshold given a first election with EG < 0 (Democratic disadvantage) or .08 or .09 when we observe EG > 0 in the first election under a
redistricting plan (Democratic advantage); the asymmetry here reflects
the fact that districting plans evincing apparent Democratic advantages
are not as durable or as common (in recent decades) as plans presenting
evidence of pro-Republican gerrymanders. At these proposed
benchmarks the overall confidence rates are estimated to be 95%, with
this confidence rate corresponding to a benchmark used widely in statistical decision-making in many fields of science.
Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 66.
110. Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 69.
111. Expert Report of Kenneth Mayer, supra note 18, at 38.
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sus. His findings illustrate that the 2012 result in Wisconsin was not a
single-election anomaly.112
Thoroughly unpacked and evaluated, these conclusions seem understandable and relatable to the Wisconsin gerrymandering claim.
But law is about advocacy, and lawyers and law students are not always familiar with the necessary mathematical concepts. These concepts can provide powerful evidence and can advance legal arguments,
but often remain underutilized or neglected, highlighting the need for
increased mathematical awareness among legal professionals.
IV. MATH AND LEGAL ADVOCACY
Math is a tool that can advance legal argument—but lawyers and
legal professionals must keep abreast of math, statistics, and applied
statistical analysis. Gill v. Whitford provides one important example
of mathematical application in litigation, and some guidance on how
to move forward in effective legal advocacy using mathematical
concepts.
A.

Get Familiar with Math

A lawyer can effectively use math in advocacy—or competently
counter opposing counsel’s use—only if they thoroughly understand
the mathematical concepts at hand. In some cases, the math is relatively simple; in other cases, more complex. In Whitford, the mathematical analysis is not incredibly complex. A multivariable regression
equation is relatively simple to create and run with simple statistics
software. That said, the statistical concepts underlying the argument
are important and understanding the fundamental principles (a regression line describing hours of sleep and level of grumpiness, for example) may mean not giving up when understanding does not come
112. Though not directly relevant to his Wisconsin findings, Professor Jackman further observes:
It is also interesting to note that the estimate of the 75th percentile of
the distribution of EG magnitudes jumps markedly after 2010, suggesting that districting plans enacted after the 2010 census are systematically more gerrymandered than in previous decades. Of the almost
800 EG estimates in the analysis, spanning 42 years of elections, the
largest, negative estimates (an efficiency gap disadvantaging Democrats) are more likely to be recorded in the short series of elections after
2010. These include Alabama in 2014 (–.18), Florida in 2012 (–.16), Virginia in 2013 (–.16), North Carolina in 2012 (–.15) and Michigan in 2012
(–.14); these five elections are among the 10 least favorable to Democrats
we observe in the entire set of elections. Among the 10 most pro-Democratic EG scores, none were recorded after 2000. The most favorable election to Democrats in terms of EG since 2010 is the 2014 election in
Rhode Island (EG = .12), which is only the 20th largest (pro-Democratic)
EG in the entire analysis.
Expert Report of Simon Jackman, supra note 40, at 44.
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easily. Most importantly, lawyers should understand enough about
math to identify issues and recognize when they do not understand a
concept, then work even harder to figure out how it relates to the legal
claim.
In most cases that involve significant mathematics, plaintiffs and
defendants will hire mathematical experts, as each side did in Whitford. An expert’s role can include both teaching the lawyers about the
concepts and also explaining them to the judge or jury. But experts
are not lawyers; lawyers understand the legal claims and the standards of proof for those claims. Experts can help, but they cannot
translate the entire analysis into those claims; that is the lawyer’s
job.113
So, research the math. Ask your experts for their opinions and ask
them to teach you. Get familiar enough with the concepts to talk about
them with others and test how well you truly know the material.
These might seem like basic tips and tricks, but the goal of your advocacy is to take the math and use it to your advantage. To do that, you
must understand the concepts and understand how to talk about
them.
B.

Frame Math Within the Legal Issue

The next step is to evaluate how the math factors into the legal
analysis. The difficulties of the Whitford plaintiffs provide an illustration. As explained in Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion, certain
plaintiffs (though not Professor Whitford himself, based on the heavily
Democratic Party leanings in the city of Madison) could have shown
individualized harm because their votes were diluted or because their
First Amendment right of association was infringed, but they did not
present sufficient facts to do so.114 As Justice Kagan suggested,
“[a]mong other ways of proving packing or cracking, a plaintiff could
produce an alternative map (or set of alternative maps)—comparably
113. Fisher, supra note 3, 735–36 (“Multiple regression analysis can play a vital role
in legal proceedings. Used properly, it is an accurate and reliable method of determining the relationships between two or more variables, and it can be a valuable tool for resolving factual disputes. In order for this to happen, however,
multiple regression must be better understood by the legal community; in particular, there must be an understanding of both the potential and the limits of the
technique. It is not necessary that lawyers understand the mechanics of multiple
regression in terms of what goes on inside the computer. It is necessary, however,
that they understand the regression model and the assumptions being used in
any given regression study, how the results of the regression bear on the hypothesis to be tested, and how the results distinguish this particular hypothesis from
other hypotheses. The expert constructing the analysis should be able to explain
all of this to the attorney who employs him, and an expert who cannot explain
such things is likely to fall apart on cross-examination.”).
114. Whitford IV, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1936, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring); see supra
notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
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consistent with traditional districting principles—under which her
vote would carry more weight.”115 With respect to the claim for associational harm, Justice Kagan found that “the plaintiffs’ evidence of
partisan asymmetry well fits” such an allegation.116 Though argumentation hindsight is twenty/twenty, Justice Kagan’s points highlight how crucial it is for lawyers to think critically about the
mathematical concepts and precisely how they support the legal theory being advanced.
In Whitford, the plaintiffs built their case around mathematical
analyses yet did not use the math to meet necessary legal requirements for standing (or for associational harm). A legal advocate must
understand what the math means to effectively use the math to make
a legal point. Evaluation of cracking and packing as mathematical
functions explained political theory in a way that certainly resonated
with Professors Mayer and Jackman and their colleagues, but the
math (apparently) did not sufficiently convey to the Court how the
plaintiffs were affected, nor were proper factual predicates laid to support those mathematical conclusions.
C.

Connect the Dots: Define and Dissect

The key to using math in legal advocacy is to connect the dots for
your audience. You cannot assume that the court or the public understands what you are saying to them in the same way you understand
it, and thus you must become “fluent” in math.
First, define the terms. Most mathematics involve terms of art,
just like the law. Regression means drawing a line that best fits the
data, and multivariable regression means drawing a line that best fits
a lot of data with many variables. Variance describes, collectively, how
far data points stray from the average of that line. It’s far more complicated than that, of course, but starting at first principles allows the
lawyer to integrate the statistical discussion into the legal arguments.
Second, dissect the expert analysis. Take on the big pieces first—here,
understanding regression and multivariable regression—then dissect
down. Understand how each point wound up where it did on the graph
and what assumptions were behind the analysis that put them there.
Sometimes baseless assumptions sneak into expert analysis: correct
yours and exploit those of your opponent.117 Once fully dissected, the
expert analysis can be put back together to support the legal discussion. The connective tissue between math and law is where cases are
won or lost.
115. Id. at 1936 (Kagan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 1937.
117. See supra note 85 (describing legal penalties for failure to support model assumptions with facts introduced in court).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to explain one important case involving
statistical analysis to show how the claim of “sociological gobbledygook” was unfounded and to provide a roadmap for future lawyers
presenting similar claims. The math mattered in Whitford and will
matter again in future gerrymandering cases.

